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Velvet Revolution or Frenzied Uteri: A Psychosocial Analysis of Reactions 
to Pussy Riot  
Abstract 
Russian reactions to Pussy Riot’s performance in Moscow’s Cathedral of Christ the 
Saviour in 2012 indicated that a collective nerve had been hit. This article seeks to explain 
the surge of public outrage following Pussy Riot’s ‘punk prayer’ through a psychosocial 
analysis of Russian media debates surrounding the case. By focusing on the negative 
responses, the following discussion investigates what such a ‘resistance to resistance’ 
might signify, and how it can point to latent forms of identification. It examines the 
public’s fixation with the group’s name, as well as the prevalence of fantasmatic 
enactments of violence in media discussions. Results suggest that in their rejection of the 
group’s performance, participants in the debate found ways of both shifting the threat 
Pussy Riot represents, and of once again ‘enjoying the nation’.   
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______________________________________________________________________ 
 
The events and their aftermath 
 
On 21 February 2012, 5 members of Russian feminist punk ‘collective’ Pussy Riot entered 
the Cathedral of Christ the Saviour in Moscow, crossed themselves in front of the altar 
and started singing a ‘punk prayer’, invoking the Mother of God to become a feminist, to 
“chase Putin away” and calling Patriarch Kirill a ’bitch’. The action was filmed, and later 
placed on YouTube, underlain with a studio recording of the song performed at the 
cathedrali. In March members Nadezhda Tolokonnikova and Maria Alekhina were 
arrested, followed by third member Ekaterina Samutsevich shortly after. Prosecutors 
accused the women of attempting to ‘incite hatred against the Orthodox church’ and 
‘hooliganism’. On July 17 the verdict was announced: 2 years in a penal colony for each of 
the women - one year less than demanded by prosecution. While Ekaterina Samutsevich 
was released on probation in October, Alekhina and Tolokonnikova were sent to penal 
colonies in Perm and Mordovia, where they spent 21 months sowing uniforms for 
members of the Russian military. Tolokonnikova and Alekhina were released on 23 
December 2013 after Vladimir Putin granted a series of amnesties for political prisoners, 
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including businessman Mikhail Khodorkovsky, to tie in with the Olympic Winter Games 
in Sochi. 
             At the time, the case became the subject of intense sociocultural debate, with 
national and international reactions ranging from discomfort to outrage and disgust, and, 
at the other end of the spectrum, from support to unbridled excitement.  The former 
faction is best exemplified by Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev’s statement in September:  
[…] from an emotional point of view – and I apologise of the un-parliamentary expression 
– what they did makes me nauseous, the way they look and the hysteria that’s 
accompanied this story.ii 
In the West, the response to the arrest, trial, and subsequent verdict was overwhelmingly 
one of indignation. International human rights organisations and members of various 
European parliaments publicly criticised the Russian government for its handling of the 
incident.  Eventually, Pussy Riot were nominated for the European Parliament’s Sakharov 
Prize for Freedom of Thought, and took up 16th place in a list of Top Global Thinkers 2012 
published by the journal Foreign Policy. Their list of celebrity supporters included artists 
such as Madonna, Sting, Sir Paul McCartney and Yoko Ono. In Russia, the vehemence 
with which the Pussy Riot debate was conducted distinguished it from other public 
scandals that preceded it: “Nothing like it has ever taken place over here” (Borusyak, 
2012). This was especially striking in the context of the heretofore apathetic 2000s - 
according to some commentators “the least political moment of modern Russian history” 
(Troitsky et al, 2013), which in turn had been preceded by the ‘crisis of group-
identification’ of the 1990s (Leonova, 2009). 
          Indeed, existing literature on post-Soviet Russia frequently claims that at the heart 
of the nation lies an absence of symbolic functions or subjective formations with which 
Russians could identify (Oushakine, 2000; Prozorov, 2009; Cassiday and Johnson, 2013). 
With an awareness of these existing accounts of the precarious or apathetic nature of 
Russians’ national attachments, developments in 2011 and 2012 led some observers of 
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Russian politics to the conclusion that the ‘void’ at the heart of Russianness created by the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, had finally been filled (Gathmann, 2012; Borusyak, 2012). 
The temporary surge in public protests and demonstrations following the parliamentary 
elections of 2011 and later presidential elections would certainly support this claim. Russia 
appeared to be in a state of crisis - a crisis that differed in a number of aspects from the 
perpetual crisis in which it had found itself since the end of the Soviet Union. The 
government and the Russian Orthodox Church, as two examples of the country's 
strongest authorities, demonstrated their apprehension at a potential loss of influence, 
with their extreme reaction to Pussy Riot’s performance in the Cathedral of Christ the 
Saviour as just one example. As one scholar put it: “When authority is waning, the 
temptation is often to show force”(Mendras, 2013). However, while the protests soon 
died down – due to the government’s brutal response, but in part  also because of the 
‘Occupy Arbai’ – movement’s inability to attract long-term support from the wider public 
(Matveev, 2014; Chehonadskih, 2014), there were clearly facets to the Pussy Riot case that 
inspired the prolonged emotive responses which other arrests of opposition members had 
failed to encourage. 
     Examining Russian media debates produced during or shortly after the trial in 2012, I 
suggest that in their rejection or championing of the group’s performance, participants in 
the debate found ways of both shifting the threat Pussy Riot represented, and of once 
again ‘enjoying the nation’ - albeit in a solidarity of wounded attachment. Reactions to the 
case are treated as symptomatic of the tensions and antagonisms of Russian society. For 
the group’s opponents, their public displays of protest represented a form of ‘stolen 
enjoyment’, from which they themselves were barred and to which the only possible 
reaction was of rejection, or even an explicit demand for punishment. Indeed, a sense of 
solidarity based on outrage, that is, a type of wounded attachment, is here seen to have 
served as a basis for identificatory processes to come to the fore. While there have been a 
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number of excellent articles reviewing Pussy Riot’s political and artistic project  (e.g. 
Chehonadskih, 2012; Prozorov, 2013), specifically the importance of their acts of protest 
in the context of post-Soviet gender politics (Gradskaya et al, 2013), less attention has 
been paid to responses by the Russian public, and what these might reflect. This article 
attempts to fill this lacuna by offering a psychosocial reading of three notable facets of the 
discourses emerging from the debate: i) a fixation with the collective’s name, which is 
connected to a need to fix and control meaning, ii) the prevalence of fantasmatic 
enactments of violence pointing to a ‘return of the repressed’, and, iii) the links to 
conspiracy theories emerging in times of societal crises and instability. By focusing on 
negative responses to the case, the following discussion investigates what this ‘resistance 
to resistance’ might signify (Blackman et al, 2008: 16), and how it points to latent forms of 
identification.  
Making sense 
While qualitatively unique and hence worthy of further scrutiny, the number of actively 
vocal participants in the debate in fact remained rather modest. According to a survey 
conducted by the All-Russian Centre for the Study of Public Opinion, more than 60% of 
respondents claimed not to have followed the trial, though 86% did indicate a general 
familiarity with the case. Those who signalled the greatest degree of interest in the trial 
were individuals with higher education (10%) and inhabitants of the ‘two capitals’ 
Moscow and St Petersburg (15%), the two traditional hubs of the country’s liberal elite. 
Also of relevance for the concerns of this article is the fact that a 53% majority of 
Russians supported the court’s verdict. An earlier survey by Levada-Center had found that 
only 5% of respondents felt that sentencing was unnecessary, with 66% of respondents 
agreeing that a prison sentence or forced labour would be more appropriate forms of 
punishmentiii. Two significant points emerge here: the aforementioned lack of engagement 
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with politics or matters of societal interest (Troitsky et al, 2013), that is, “social dispersion 
and/or narcissistic withdrawal (Oushakine, 2000: 1011), which is a consequence both of 
the late Soviet era, and the tumult and ‘non-identity’ of the 1990s (Yurchak, 2005; 
Prozorov, 2009). The other is that, because active participation in the Pussy Riot – debate 
was by no means prevalent and mainly restricted to certain segments of the population, 
there must have been something at stake for those taking part, a kind of ‘psychic pay-off’, 
for example as a reward for defending the coveted object or self-representation that was 
under threat at this time. Did it assist participants in re-affirming positive, ‘ideal-type’ 
images of the nation to which they – despite prior displays to the contrary, or of 
indifference – continued to be attached? Did Pussy Riot’s actions represent a kind of 
excessive enjoyment, which needed to be disavowed through denigration and 
punishment? Did the women perhaps serve as a surface onto which the anxieties pertinent 
to the crisis of government were projected?  
         There were clearly elements both in the women, and in the possible gratifications of 
participating in the Pussy Riot debate, that inspired the emotional responses, which other 
cases had failed to elicit. In their policing of Russianness and the demarcation of features 
deemed undesirable as embodied by the women of Pussy Riot, these discourses in fact 
point to latent forms of identification, or to the potential construction of libidinal 
communities through a shared sense of outrage. In the following discussion, the strongly 
negative reactions to the ‘punk prayer’ are contrasted with a shorter section on reactions 
by the group’s supporters, thereby reflecting the proportional distribution of detractors 
and supporters among the Russian public. It is argued here that a psychosocial 
methodology is especially well-placed to conduct such an analysis, as it provides a 
framework for considering how subjects may be invested in a particular discourse 
(Branney, 2008; Frosh & Baraitser, 2008). Where a purely discursive reading might seek to 
identify subject positions assumed by participants in the debate, what the taking up of 
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these positions enabled subjects to do, and their interaction with existing discursive 
repertoires, a psychosocial analysis investigates subjects’ attachment (or aversion) to these 
positions, aiming to identify the modes as well as potential of such attachments. As so 
much of the public debate around Pussy Riot was conducted in a highly emotive register, 
it is also worthwhile to consider the theoretical apparatus around the study of affect. 
However, employing the term ‘affect’ is somewhat misleading, as it is not affect per se that 
is examined here, but the 'multi-modal situated event' (Wetherell, 2015: 159) of affect, that 
is, how affect is 'created' and performed around a specific episode such as the 
performance and trial of Pussy Riot.  
            As already indicated, the present discussion is seeking to answer why this 
particular time, and particular type of event was able to mobilise such a number of 
affective responses. Following Sara Ahmed (2004a, 2004b), affect is treated as a 
profoundly social phenomenon, constituting the objects at which it is seemingly directed, 
so that, for instance, the nation can come about through the collective mobilisation of 
love, or hate for its perceived enemies, not dissimilar to the ‘passionate attachments’ 
theorised by Judith Butler (1997). The article also reflects on how subjects come to see 
others as causing certain kinds of affect. Denigration of the other, and avowals of love are 
here closely related, both establishing affect as a kind of speech act that is highly 
performative (Ahmed, 2004a, 2004b). Rather than seeing affect as ‘prediscursive’, 
Margaret Wetherell (2013) argues that an interest in affect need not entail a turn away 
from discourse, though this does not necessarily result in a perfect overlap. Crociani-
Windland and Hoggett highlight that affect is only ever temporarily contained 
in discourse, thus always threatening to 'break through' (Crociani-Windland &Hoggett, 
2012: 169). Finally, pertinent to the concerns of the present discussion is their analysis of 
how emotions such as ‘ressentiment’, based on long-term grievances and a sense of 
powerlessness, can either become politicised, or become subject to other forms of 
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compensatory behaviour. This also requires addressing the enjoyment that can be derived 
from moments of collective, intense affect.  
Pathologising Pussy Riot  
The language of psychoanalysis has not only left the clinic and entered popular discourse 
(Parker, 1997), in the case of Pussy Riot, it has been aligned with the predominantly 
conservative gender politics of Russia. As indicated by the article’s title, the notion of 
hysteria was not only applied to a translation of the group’s name – its implications served 
as motivation for the women’s behaviour, who were remote-diagnosed with a number of 
disorders, from mental illness to actual possession by demons. This type of argument 
circulated by the detractors of Pussy Riot is of course a classic strategy to weaken 
arguments put forward by women – coming from an unreliable, possibly hysteric or 
mentally unstable source, the arguments themselves are unlikely to be credible. This may 
indeed be one of the strategies to keep at bay the anxiety which these young women have 
stirred up. Much of the aggression that is on display is directed towards the lifestyles the 
women are seen to represent. In some media treatments, the Pussy Riot Case was in fact 
pitched as a direct confrontation between Putin and Pussy Riot, who symbolically stood in 
for old, authoritarian, and new, democratic and free-spirited Russia, or between a punitive 
masculinity and a liberated and hence threatening femininity. Paradoxically, the group 
members are seen as both too feminine to be taken seriously as political activists, such as 
when their activism is linked to ‘broken hearts’, and their feminist standpoints treated as a 
consequence of a disappointment following unsuccessful relationships with men (Mustafa, 
2012), yet also as not feminine enough, such as when they are criticised for their lack of 
adequate display of motherhood. As some of the most outrageous members of a cultural 
elite, Pussy Riot are seen by their opponents to be personifying an excessive kind of 
enjoyment, a type of jouissance that becomes all the more menacing as it insists on 
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displaying itself publicly. One way of explaining what it is that makes the group so 
threatening is that they may be seen to be in possession of a type of enjoyment from 
which ‘ordinary’ Russians are barred or to which they’ve lost access - a coveted quality or 
ability which is then exaggerated and treated as a threat to a more properly Russian, and 
therefore more reassuring, way of life. As will become apparent in the following sections, 
adversaries of Pussy Riot often resort to aggressive or violent language – at times with 
barely veiled sexual connotations. The two registers are combined in a discourse marked 
by profanity, which becomes all the more contradictory as the members of Pussy Riot are 
so frequently criticised for their use of expletives - still something of a taboo in Russia, 
particularly for women. Even in more benign manifestations of this strand of discourse, 
the three women were repeatedly referred to as ‘silly fools’ (дуры) or ‘idiots’ (идиотки) 
by both journalists and bloggers. Finally, the group’s name and politics regarding gender 
and sexuality evoked a whole slew of negative responses, ranging from unease to revulsion 
and outright rejection.  
 
What’s in a name? 
In contributions to discussions about Pussy Riot, a metonymic slide frequently took place 
from a personal unease with the name, one’s choice of translation into Russian, to how 
the women should be judged altogether. Language, like any symbolic system, is marked by 
condensation and overdetermination of meaning, leaving it forever open to interpretation. 
This openness seemed particularly anxiety-provoking when it comes to translations of the 
group’s name. The unease caused by the multiplicity of meanings becomes all the more 
pronounced as the name contains a threat – the promise of violence and change inherent 
in the word ‘riot’, as well as sexual, potentially obscene connotations. Both words are in 
English, making its sense doubly obscure, as well as implying a potential pandering to the 
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West, or Westernised ideas. The threat that the group represents is therefore partially 
embodied by its ambiguous name. This ambiguity needs to be managed; meaning needs to 
be fixed – for example by staking a claim to the name’s definite translation, which can 
focus on regressive or progressive elements of the name, exaggerate or understate the 
sexual or violent associations. The spectrum of translations into Russian ranges from 
‘Frenzied Vagina’, the most popular choiceiv, to ‘Frenzied Uteri’, ‘Frenzied Kitten’ and, 
finally, ‘Velvet Revolution’. 
             In October 2012, online business newspaper Business Gazeta published the results 
of a survey it had conducted among its readers. The survey asked: “Do you know how to 
translate the name of the group Pussy Riot into Russian?” and published 20 detailed 
statements. In many of them, an easy equation is made between words and actions – a 
name that carries violent connotations is almost automatically assumed to aim at violent 
actions: 
 
[…] And actually this is what it [i.e. the name, MB] aims to do – the violation of 
linguistic norms goes hand in hand with the violation of social norms. 
 
This kind of mental operation puts the symbolic and the literal on the same plane. 
There appeared to be an almost wilful inability by subjects to use language 
playfully, or to distance themselves from words or symbols. The conjured threat is 
further qualified in the following quote:  
 
If in their publications, the media were to use the Russian translation instead of the 
English version, the perception in society would be completely different. The group would 
not attract so many sympathisers. After all, what is a riot? Chaos and destruction. And 
the use of this word in combination with female genitals points to a feminisation. Pussy 
Riot oppose the traditional family, and support homosexual relations. This is abnormal. 
This is a form of perversion. 
 
Several elements emerge here: there is an implicit criticism of the group’s decision to use an 
English name, as if this suggests a performance exclusively for the Western gaze, or for the 
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small circle of initiated Russian intelligentsia. The image that is further evoked is doubly 
menacing: the wholesale ‘chaos’ and ‘destruction’ of one’s way of life, including that of 
traditional gender dynamics and –identity. The women’s feminism and non-traditional 
lifestyles are seen as direct attacks on the ‘traditional family’ – one indication of which is an 
alleged support of ‘homosexual relations’. 
      How is this danger to be kept at bay, and how are subjects to manage the sense of 
revulsion that the performative evocation of the other’s enjoyment seems to provoke? 
After all, what does it represent if not illicit enjoyment, “something that the desiring 
subjects hanker after; it exemplifies the displaced element of their being that they 
experience as unjustly lost" (Hook, 2011:143). One way of containing it, as we have seen, is 
to denigrate the other by exaggerating or unjustly dwelling on certain aspects of their 
demeanour and what this is seen to represent: 
How to translate the name of this group? But there are unprintable words…”Frenzied, 
possessed vagina” – this is how this combination of words is translated. I follow this punk 
group’s case, and I am deeply disgusted by what the girls have done. Of course the sentence 
is very harsh, but on the other hand it serves as a demonstrative flogging for those who 
trespass in a similar way.  
At the same time, repeated references to forms of punishment that could or should be 
administered to the women could mean that there is a link to be made between the 
violence inflicted upon them in the form of incarceration and forced labour, and fantasies 
of violence acted out in some of the reactions to Pussy Riot. These considerations will be 
returned to in the conclusion, which reflects on the necessity of identifying perpetrators 
for this ‘theft of enjoyment’, in order to create communities of the offended joined 
together in wounded attachments.  
Return of the Repressed 
An article discussing the result of a survey conducted in September 2012 made this link 
explicit:  
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Maybe the icon defilers and Pussy Riot just need a good flogging? 
Incidentally, as a survey by All-Russian Centre for the Study of Public Opinion 
showed, every fourth Russian is not opposed to such corporal punishment. 
27% of respondents are in favour of adding corporal punishment to the 
Criminal Code.v  
The recurrent fantasmatic enactments of corporal punishment, which find their 
expression in the sexualised, even ritualised image of a flogging, point to a violence that 
spilled over into, and ended up permeating the public responses to Pussy Riot. One 
explanation locates their origin in events or discourses preceding these more recent 
incidents. Indeed, Russian history of the 20th century is full of both brief eruptions of 
brutality, and sustained periods of destruction. There has been violence of a total and 
totalitarian nature, such as during Stalinism; or, of a less paranoid and absolute, but 
nevertheless traumatic kind, such as during the chaotic 1990s (e.g. Oushakine, 2009; 
Prozorov, 2009). This violence seeped into, and was re-enforced by discourses of these 
periods – be it the official Stalinist rhetoric with its strange euphemisms such as “Life has 
gotten better; life has become more cheerful”vi, or its ubiquitous, thinly veiled references 
to state brutality, such as “Лес рубят, щепки летят”, which can roughly be translated 
as “You cannot make an omelette without breaking eggs”. A more prominent violence in 
language became the norm in the 1990s after the abolishment of official state censorship. 
Obscene and slang terms, previously taboo, entered popular culture through films and 
books of the period (Borenstein, 2008). Therefore, while official remembrance and the 
working-through of the trauma of Stalinism has been all but banished, the period’s 
linguistic manifestations have never fully disappeared. Its violence may have been (almost 
completely) repressed, but the discourse of ‘Putinism’ has retained the ‘performative 
aspects’ (Gusejnov, 2012) of this aspect of Russian history.  
       Another telling example is a statement prepared after a meeting by the ‘Workers’ 
Collective Togliattiazot’vii in October 2012, in which it announced that it: 
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 […] is prepared to receive the Pussy Riot hooligans in their business after completion of 
their sentence in order to re-educate these party-girls from the capital in their healthy work 
atmosphere so as to help them become worthy members of society, as well as real mothers. 
In these conditions the workers’ collective ‘Togliattiazot’ gives a firm workers’ ‘no’ in 
response to the boulevard-haunting loafers from the capital and their ‘foreign’ group of 
supporters.viii  
One need not perform a discourse analyse to recognise the proto-Soviet language in use: 
the announcement is spoken from a position of collectivity and propriety, in opposition to 
the small minority which is being condemned here for its loose morals and general 
attitude of frivolity.  According to Gasan Gusejnov, this is in fact how the Pussy Riot 
debate is conducted by the group’s critics: ”on the one side is the enemy, one the other – 
one of us” (Gusejnov, 2012: 4). The threat of a compulsory re-education programme 
smacks of the ambitions of the early Soviet period to create New Soviet Man, and the 
reference to ‘real’ motherhood – presumably versus the simulacrum of maternity provided 
by “these party-girls” – is reminiscent of fascist discourse. The omnipresent paranoia and 
fear of foreign infiltration so typical of Stalinism is also represented here in the reference 
to support by non-Russians. 
           Why then this resort, or regression to archaic and violent language? Gusejnov’s 
argument, with more than a hint of Kulturpessimismus to it, is that the failure to conduct a 
proper Destalinisation of language since the 1950s means these linguistic resources have 
been available throughout, in fact experiencing an increased ‘demand’ in the last decade. 
The fact that Stalinist rhetoric is ‘formulaic’ and ‘derisive’ as well as uniquely ‘accessible to 
the common man’, together with the – according to Gusejnov – prevalent Stalinist social 
practice of the “joyful repression of consciousness” (ibid., p. 6), that is, the suppression of 
any tendency towards empathy, led to a society that is uniquely intolerant and rigorous in 
its demands to punish the other – perhaps as a result of having split off these 
uncomfortable aspects of itself, and then needing to locate them in others:  “let’s imagine 
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a society which lives […] without self-analysis – not reflexively, but deflectively” (Guseijnov, 
2012: 4, my emphasis).  
             In other words: while a ‘return of the repressed’ is commonly linked to neurotic 
symptoms, that is, a repression of infantile wishes which subsequently resurface as 
behavioural symptoms or fantasies, the title of this section reflects the argument that there 
is a case to be made for a return of the repressed in and through language. The improper 
‘working-through’ of the past, evidenced by the unreflecting use of the linguistic memes 
of Stalinism which have been emptied of any links to historical context, means that it thus 
retained a violence which is now coming back to haunt the speaking subject and its 
discourse. This violence is symptomatic of an inability to tolerate the ambiguity inherent 
in the multiple meanings of the group’s name and its performances referred to in the 
previous section, and was perhaps triggered by the anxiety provoked by a potentially 
regression to the 1990s implied in the group’s name. Rather than retain a position of 
ambivalence regarding Pussy Riot, a stance that appears ‘safer’ to the most vocal 
opponents of the group is one of rejection. This has been taken to an extreme by on of 
the most notable detractors of the group, who has taken to the case with a quasi-religious 
fervour.  
Man on a Mission 
The shrillness which the tone of discussions about PR could attain reached a well-
publicised apogee in a series of documentaries and interviews involving infamous 
investigative TV journalist Andrey Mamontov. Between spring and autumn 2012, he 
produced and broadcast three documentaries about Pussy Riot, each entitled 
"Провокаторы", or“Agitators”, on Russia’s Channel One (Perviy Kanal – Rossiya). The 
main thesis underlying all three programmes was that the cathedral performance was not a 
political act of protest, but instead aimed to provoke and create a rift in the Orthodox 
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Church, thereby weakening the country’s ‘moral foundations’. Mamontov referred to 
members of the group exclusively as "кощунницы"– ‘blasphemers’, and translated their 
name as “crazed female genitals”, thus providing further substance to the link established 
between the public’s relationship to the group’s name and overall interpretation of, and 
response to their actions. This sense of a mission was taken on by him with great gravitas 
and verve, leading to what one might term an excessive production of language and 
images in the form of 3 feature-length documentaries. Importantly, one should assume 
this outrage to be, if not entirely strategic, then at least carefully planned in its public form 
of expression. It appears that Mamontov touched upon a specific configuration of the 
Pussy Riot-debate and was willing to become a sounding board for it.   
           What emerged repeatedly in Mamontov’s films and public statements was a 
tendency to arrive at a partial understanding of their message. This is particularly 
remarkable when considering that some observers had criticised the group for their lack 
of a clear agenda (Chehonadskih, 2012). There is no such hesitation in Mamontov:  ‘they’ 
were trying to destroy Russia’s faith, and with it the entire country. For Mamontov, there 
are only two positions in the debate – for or against; good or evil.  No platform is 
provided or even imagined possible for a more ambivalent stance. The ‘mission’ on which 
Mamontov sees himself is one for which he was personally selected: “I was only 
appointed by God” in order to defend “God’s presence in this world” (Surganova, 2012). 
This insistence on having a divine calling is coupled with a sense of being personally 
addressed and attacked by Pussy Riot:  “They came into my home. […] They touched my 
faith. So now what, I’m supposed to forgive them?”(ibid.) 
            It is worthwhile paying attention to the patterns and structure evident in the 
discourses that Mamontov employed deliberately  in order to trigger affect and engender 
solidarity in the audience. He chiefly achieved this through personalising the way it is held, 
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that is, by presenting the performance as an attack on the religious and moral sensibilities 
of each upstanding citizen of Russia. When an interviewer refused to be swayed by an 
appeal to morals or religion, Mamontov changed tactics to further enhance the potential 
for insult: 
It’s your birthday, your mother and father are seated at the table, and suddenly strangers 
in masks come in and start dancing on the table, scattering the apples and the cake. And 
you wouldn’t complain to the police? (ibid.) 
The scene of three young masked women dancing and singing in a cathedral is 
transformed into the image of a peaceful family celebration disrupted by the terrifying 
intrusion of strangers. However, one is left wondering to what moral or spiritual authority 
the TV journalist is appealing here in order to seek assistance against what he presents as 
an intolerable threat. What emerges is an injunction to feel affronted, to demand 
punishment.  
           While remaining fixated on certain individuals or objects that were treated as 
sources of harm, Mamontov integrated them into a more elaborate conceptualisation of 
the universe. According to his programmes, the crisis in which Russia had found itself was 
the result of an  “infernal liberal mollusc, which has spread its tentacles all over the 
country” (Surganova, 2012). In his analysis, the nation was set to lose its sovereignty, and 
Russians as a people could lose their identity due to a process of cultural and moral 
colonisation by the West. In fact, Russia of the 1990s displayed a similar prevalence of 
conspiracy theories. One of the most popular manifestations was the supposed existence 
of the Dulles Plan, an alleged Cold War- era plot by the CIA with the distinct aim of 
bringing down the Soviet Union through the erosion of its moral and aesthetic 
foundations (Aleksandrov, 2012). In both anti-Pussy Riot discourses and previous 
narratives of national threat and disintegration, blame was either allocated directly to the 
West, or to the country’s liberal opposition, which was seen to be financed by foreign 
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supporters seeking to weaken Russia. In fact, in recent years statements designating 
members of the intelligentsia as traitors or as belonging to the ‘5th column’ have once 
more become prevalent (Baunov, 2013).  
Who gets to speak for Russia? 
So far, the analysis has focused on the group’s opponents. However, this investigation 
would be skewed without some consideration of the nature of pro-Pussy Riot responses. 
Like the detractors, supporters saw this case as a symbolic struggle over the country’s 
future, so that it beccame pivotal to take a stand against the treatment the women have 
experienced. They engaged in a similarly affect-laden discussion over who gets to speak 
for Russia, and what kind of Russia is to be envisioned. For the supporters, too, the 
question arose of what the moral or ethical foundations of this nation are to be. A sense 
of social and cultural alienation spoke through their reactions – the country’s intelligentsia 
may be in the minority, but at the same time it has always relied on this sense of isolation 
or distinctness to make up its identity and fuel its struggles (Gessen, 1997; Sandomirskaja, 
1995). When envisioning a different Russia, the question that perpetually occupies the 
opposition is where the nation’s gaze should turn. Should it be looking toward the West, 
as much of the capital-dwelling ‘creative class’ seems to suggest, or should the gaze turn 
inward, and perhaps even to the past? The second option can at times rely on historical, 
or rather, imaginary notions of Russian greatness founded on a mixture of Orthodox 
Christianity and literary images of a pre-communist, Tsarist Russia. Present-day Russia, on 
the other hand, tends to be defined in terms of its ‘backwardness’, explained by an 
unfinished civilising process: 
Russian society is adolescent, nasty, having undergone Christianisation only 
in appearance. That is why Russians stick to people from their own circle. 
And whoever happens to be outside might as well end up at the stake 
(especially, if this pleases the bosses). (Gubin, 2012) 
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This tone, which can be encountered so frequently, is characterised by arrogance, and a 
missionary zeal to educate the majority of the Russian people, liberating them from their 
lack of aesthetic sophistication and general primitivism in the process. Directions for 
readers of such pieces penned by the opposition include the following recommendation 
by academic and journalist Dmitrii Gubin: “I think that looking up online the unfamiliar 
words and names from my text is a useful exercise” (Gubin, 2012).  Not only were those 
who oppose Pussy Riot declared undereducated and lacking in sophistication, they were 
also accused of being driven by an inability to distinguish between symbolic and material 
reality: “A central position hereby is assumed by the logic of violent physical acts in 
response to symbolic ones” (Gusejnov, 2012: 6). This intolerance of ambiguity, and 
suspicion of the open-endedness of language is in line with the present analysis. However, 
the opposition’s agenda of enlightenment from above meant that they suffered from a 
similar zeal to fix meaning in order to align it with this agenda: 
In the given context, if we are to look at the word order, we can see that the word pussy 
comes first, which means it serves as an adjective. According to dictionaries, it is to be 
translated as ‘tender, soft, velvety’. Riot, on the other hand, means uprising, revolution. 
Together it can be translated as ‘velvet revolution’. There is no evidence of indecent meaning 
here. What they had in mind was the same kind of revolution as the one take that took 
place in Czechoslovakia. It’s a global idea – a change in power without bloodshed. I am 
certain that this is the only correct translation.ix 
This version skirts around the deliberate provocation and shock-value of the group’s 
name, in order to produce the most benign, acceptable translation possible. While 
some may thus criticise the absence of a concrete vision at the heart of Pussy Riot’s 
project, for the participants in the debate this very absence has supplied ample space 
for their own projections, in order to celebrate or vilify the women. Overall, the 
reading favoured by the group’s supporters, is illustrative of the profound split in 
contemporary Russia, where the nation itself is divided into two groups: the 
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uneducated and uncouth masses, and the cultivated, liberal elite which, in the 
footsteps of the classic intelligentsia, sees itself as holding the monopoly on being able 
to speak for Russia (Matveev, 2014). An important facet of this split, which was 
made apparent through the examination of discourses of Pussy Riot, is the fact that it 
is to some degree reproduced among the liberal elite in Russia. The outrage that 
many participants in the debate felt when the coveted object of the nation was 
perceived to be threatened is in direct contrast to other members of the 
intelligentsia’s elevation and celebration of the women and the kind of Russia they 
represent.  
Enjoying the nation  
If we recall that any process of identification requires affect in the form of libidinal 
investment in order to sustain it, then the affect-laden responses to the case appear to 
point to a form of identification: 
The important point is to realise that without this cathectic (affective) investment 
in an object […] there will not be a symbolic order either. So the affective, the 
cathectic investment, is not the other of the symbolic but its very precondition.  
(Glynos and Stavrakakis, 2010: 236) 
Following this analysis, it can be more convincingly argued that previous declarations to 
the opposite effect, that is, statements that seem to indicate a lack of identification with 
the nation or indeed a refusal to do so, in fact point to Judith Butler’s idea that this can be 
an indication of identification already having taken place (Butler, 1997). Such a ‘wounded 
attachment’ was perhaps the only form of national identification possible for most 
Russians at this particular historical juncture. While this did not yet seem to be the stage at 
which there could be a positive affirmation of the nation, it was in the open rejection of 
another faction’s position that an outline of this image could be discerned. What was 
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unsettling to the analyst is how distinctly different these vision were, reinforcing the 
notion of a profound split in Russian society.  
       One way of bringing identificatory processes to the fore is therefore to stage a 
possible loss of this ideal. Sociologist Lyubov Borusyak seems justified in saying that a 
more stable society would have been able to tolerate this potential danger, but in these 
rather tense times for Russia, it was relatively easy to present one of the many acts of 
protest as a threat to the very foundations of the nation. However, this is not to say that 
Pussy Riot was selected as an arbitrary target for attention and punishment. The 
disconcerting nature of their particular configuration of femininity (Gradskaya et al, 2013), 
together with their brazen criticism of the country’s two major authorities, provided a 
perfect target.  
        Žižek claims that: “A nation exists only as long as its specific enjoyment continues to 
be materialized in a set of social practices and transmitted through national myths.” (1993: 
112). He presents this enjoyment as the key to understanding a community’s coherence in 
opposition to other communities – each society attempts to cover over its inherent 
antagonism by ‘outsourcing’ it (see also Stavrakakis, 2008). One way of comprehending 
the prolonged negative responses to the case, and the subsequent counterreactions by the 
opposition is therefore that they provide a way of ‘enjoying the nation’. In more Butlerian 
terms: the nation is ‘performed’ in the act of feeling outraged. Similarly, in Ahmed’s 
reading, the object of one’s idealisation is constituted and cemented through emotion or 
affect that is directed at it (Ahmed, 2004a, 2004b). There is, of course, no pre-existing, 
positive content to signifiers such as Russianness. In order to bring into being a society or 
nation, this very nation first needs to stage a threat or loss, so that this quality under threat 
can become an essential part of the nation’s identity. In Žižekian terms, this occurs 
whenever a society attempts to cover over its inherent antagonism or split - the fact that 
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in reality it does not exist, is only imagined - by ‘outsourcing’ this conflict. This is perhaps 
best illustrated by the eruption of nationalist conflicts after the breakup of the former 
Eastern bloc. Socialism, according to Žižek, functioned as a kind of positive ‘guarantor’ 
for the social pact. While allowing Eastern Europeans to keep a type of ‘cynical distance’ 
from its ideology, it nevertheless functioned as a ‘social glue’ holding society together. 
Citizens of former socialist countries experienced the disappearance of this ‘big Other’ 
and subsequent upheaval as a traumatic encounter with the Real (Žižek, 
1993:129). Aggressive displays of nationalism towards ethnic minorities and neighbouring 
countries, as well as denigration of others seen to disturb order internally, can thus be seen 
as desperate attempts to prevent a feared disintegration of society.  
  Conclusion 
This article sought to explain the surge of negative affect following Pussy Riot’s 
performance and subsequent involvement with the legal apparatus. Reactions were read in 
terms of a response to a threat, leading to the proliferation of discourses that displayed a 
fixation with the collective’s name related to a need to fix and control meaning, as well as 
a prevalence of fantasmatic enactments of violence pointing to a ‘return of the repressed’. 
The discourses speak of a fear of disintegration and chaos, of wishing to avoid a return to 
the traumatic 1990s. They appear to circumscribe different variations of the same fantasy 
object – that of the nation as not just resilient, but triumphant, as well as giving further 
clues into the nature of  ‘passionate attachments’ (Butler, 1997) to this object.  Two 
distinct types of enjoyment emerged. The opponents of Pussy Riot found it in the 
enactment of outrage and anger. This is not to dispute the emotional reaction or 
confusion that some may have experienced at first, but this was amplified wilfully in order 
to prolong the enjoyment that accompanies these sensations, as there is surely also 
enjoyment in the deliberate celebration of, or indulgence in affect. The ‘creative class’, on 
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the other hand, found their enjoyment and forms of identification in a celebration of the 
aesthetics of protest, the appreciation of which it presents only itself as possessing. Both 
parties were granted a sense of knowing how to protect the national ideal. This, seemingly 
contradictory location of ‘enjoyment’ in both groups in fact points to its paradoxical 
nature, whereby the double meaning of passionate attachments can imply both a collective 
celebration of positive affect, as well as a modality of collective complaint and outrage. In 
fact, it appears that in specific cases a libidinal community can be manufactured almost 
overnight in light of offence by fostering a solidarity of jouissance, of shared suffering or 
injustice. Russian reactions to Pussy Riot therefore revealed not only the tensions and 
antagonisms in Russian society generally – they also point a split at the heart of the 
intelligentsia, whereby some found enjoyment in the new type of jouissance the women 
represent, while others celebrate their outrage at the group’s contempt for traditional 
values.  
          Revisiting these observations in 2015, with Putin’s approval ratings at an all-time 
high of 86%x, it appeared that an even more effective way of suturing the split in Russian 
society had been found. Indeed, the surge of patriotism that followed the annexation of 
‘fetish object’ Crimea and subsequent armed conflict in Ukraine may have secured Putin’s 
reign for another term.  Under pressure from economic sanctions and the low oil price, 
the newly drafted social contract was no longer able to provide relative economic stability 
to enable consumption for obedient, apolitical subjects – the basis of its support prior to 
the Global Financial Crisis and subsequent protests. Instead, it redirects existing societal 
tensions such as those revealed by the Pussy Riot case. Lev Gudkov, together with 
colleagues from Levada-Center, illustrates how the antagonisms of Russian society have 
been effectively channeled in a process of ‘negative mobilization’ (Gudkov, 2014), whose 
targets are in turn influenced by the existence of anti-Western myths in combination with 
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evocations of perceived former glory (Budraitskis, 2016). It is therefore important to 
remember that the antagonisms of Russian society have not been resolved. They have 
merely been given new targets in the service of nationalistic sentiment, which requires the 
spectre of ever-new enemies. It appears as if in Russia, an appearance of societal stability 
can only be retained through the prevalent mechanism of blaming an other – members of 
the creative class such as Pussy Riot or the former ‘brother nation’ of Ukraine as just two 
examples.  
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